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Abstract
We analyze an endogenous growth model with agents diﬀering in their endowments. Poor
entrepreneurs with limited liability need to borrow in ﬁnancial markets to participate in aggre-
gate output production. We show that the ﬁrst-best solution can either be achieved by decen-
tralized ﬁnancial contracting or by employing a project-speciﬁc subsidy policy.
If additional capital market imperfections are introduced into the model, a negative link
between inequality and growth emerges. Then, the impact of inequality on growth increases
for a higher degree of frictions.
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the conditions that lead to optimal eco-
nomic growth in an agency-model of ﬁnancial contracting. In this model, a risk-neu-
tral entrepreneur chooses an unobservable level of eﬀort. He may employ the
investment funds of a risk-neutral investor while both, entrepreneur and investor,
are constrained by limited liability. We show that the ﬁrst-best solution can either
Nomenclature
h index of individuals
eh,t random human capital endowment share
c start-up cost of an entrepreneurial project
k wealth level of the poorest entrepreneur
k
sdc wealth level of the poorest entrepreneur with a standard debt contract
l index of the poorest borrowing entrepreneur exerting e 
p  expected project payoﬀ with e 
pi project payoﬀ if outcome i realizes
p
sdc(e) expected project payoﬀ with a standard debt contract
q riskless rate of interest
^ q borrowers  net repayment rate
xh,t human capital endowment of individual h in cohort t
P random return of an entrepreneurial project
c(e) eﬀort cost function
bh amount of external ﬁnance
dh,t consumption of individual h
e entrepreneurial eﬀort
F(e) economy s cdf of capital endowment shares
g growth rate of aggregate output
i index of project payoﬀ states
kh individual h s endowment with physical capital (xh ¼ kh)
n number of possible project payoﬀ realizations
pi(e) probability of project outcome i
s subsidy ensuring e 
ti repayment to the lender in payoﬀ state i
yt aggregate output in period t
At stock of knowledge available at the beginning of period t
R expected repayment generated by any transfer system T
R
FBmax largest repayment generated by a ﬁrst-best contract
R
max largest repayment generated by any contract (possibly nonmonotonic)
T any feasible repayment scheme
Uh
t utility of individual h in cohort t
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subsidy policy.
Recent empirical research, based on cross-country-regression analysis, has identi-
ﬁed a negative relation between inequality and growth. Prominent examples include
Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Aghion et al. (1999). In response to this ﬁnding,
models have been constructed which predict lower growth rates as inequality be-
comes more severe. For surveys of the recent theoretical literature, see Barro
(2000), Aghion et al. (1999) and Benabou (1996). There exists a variety of ap-
proaches which encompass political turmoils as well as voting behavior as possible
transmission channels. Another strand of the literature examines the role of credit-
market imperfections due to moral hazard in the inequality-growth context (e.g.
Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Piketty, 1997). These contributions build on an incentive
argument whereby inequality worsens entrepreneurial incentives which in turn
depresses the economy s growth rate as emphasized by Aghion et al. (1999).
1 Entre-
preneurial investment projects in these models are very speciﬁc in that project returns
follow a binomial distribution.
The recent contribution of Forbes (2000) to the empirical literature challenges the
supposed negative link between income inequality and growth. Given this observa-
tion, our model demonstrates that the existence of credit market imperfections due
to limited liability in a model of endogenous growth is not necessarily inconsistent
with these results.
In contrast to the cited theoretical literature, we assume a general class of invest-
ment projects where revenue is discretely distributed. We ﬁnd that the outcome of
decentralized ﬁnancial contracting can be Pareto-eﬃcient.
2 Thereby credit-market
frictions due to moral hazard are overcome and inequality does not aﬀect entrepre-
neurial incentives and growth anymore. If the Pareto-eﬃcient eﬀort level is not
implementable by decentralized contracting, a project-speciﬁc subsidy policy can
be employed which retains the ﬁrst-best solution.
The rationale for our result is as follows. Poor entrepreneurs are residual claim-
ants of their project and its eﬀort incentives depend on implementable contracts.
The multiple state distribution of payoﬀs allows for the design of contracts which
do not distort the entrepreneur s eﬀort decision. With a two-state payoﬀ distribution,
this requires repayments to coincide in both states due to oﬀsetting marginal prob-
abilities. Since in the lower proﬁt state the repayment exceeds the payoﬀ, limited lia-
bility prevents the coincidence of transfers. Therefore, the repayment in the low state
is always smaller than in the high state, additional eﬀort increases expected repay-
ment, and the borrower s eﬀort choice is suboptimal. In contrast, a richer payoﬀ dis-
tribution allows to oﬀset the eﬀect of unequal transfers by the possibility to condition
repayments on additional states such that the marginal expected repayment can be
1 In the model of Aghion et al. (1999), the elimination of inequality is the only way to increase the
growth rate to its optimal level. This is achieved by permanent redistribution.
2 This complements the ﬁnding of Innes (1990). He analyses a ﬁnancial contracting problem with moral
hazard and limited liability where the returns to an investment project follow a continuous distribution.
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implying a Pareto-eﬃcient eﬀort choice.
The existence of repayment schemes inducing a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation re-
quires state-contingent contracts and costless state veriﬁcation. With costly state
veriﬁcation, Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Townsend (1979) have shown the opti-
mality of the standard debt contract. With standard debt contracts, entrepreneurs
must share marginal eﬀort return with investors. Hence, eﬀort is distorted away
from the ﬁrst-best level such that a negative link between inequality and growth
prevails. However, the magnitude of the impact of inequality on economic growth
is driven by the degree of capital market imperfections, which is consistent with
Barro (2000).
2. The static model
In this section, we introduce an inequality-and-growth model with credit market
imperfections. In this model, one generation of risk-neutral individuals succeeds the
former one until eternity. Upon birth, individuals in the same cohort receive hetero-
genous human capital endowments. They may be regarded as entrepreneurs since
every agent pursues an investment project. The distinctive feature of our model is
a richer payoﬀ distribution of investment projects which may allow for ﬁrst-best
growth unlike similar models with extremely rudimentary distribution speciﬁcations
(see e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Aghion et al., 1999).
Each individual lives for two subperiods and is endowed with one unit of raw
labor as well as some human capital. In particular, any individual h in cohort t
embodies human capital wh,t ¼ eh,t Æ At where At denotes the stock of knowledge
available at the beginning of period t measured in ‘‘eﬃciency units’’. The continuous
random variable e is distributed independently and identically over individuals and
cohorts with cdf F(e) such that E(e) ¼ 1 and e P 0.
The timing of events is summarized in Fig. 1. In the ﬁrst subperiod, individuals
are young and produce a capital good with a 1:1-technology where each eﬀective unit
of labor (raw labor reﬁned by individual knowledge) creates one unit of capital.
Since raw labor is ﬁxed at unity, individual h produces kh ¼ wh units of physical cap-
ital. Preferences are represented by:
Fig. 1. Timing of events.
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where dt denotes consumption at the end of lifetime and C(Æ) measures nonmonetary
costs of eﬀort devoted to an investment project. The opportunity cost of eﬀort reduc-
tion is the expected decrease in consumption. Since consumption increases in the
stock of knowledge, opportunity costs of eﬀort reduction increase over time and it
is natural to assume that eﬀort s costs increase in At, too. If e is interpreted as the
number of labor hours devoted to the project, the assumption implies that disutility
of labor grows as labor productivity increases. This reﬂects the increasing value of
leisure activities as their quality/variety beneﬁts from improved labor productivity.
In particular, the eﬀort cost is deﬁned by C(eh,t,At) ¼ c(eh,t) Æ At. This guarantees a
stationary level of ﬁrst-best eﬀort over time. Total eﬀort costs per eﬃciency unit,
c(e), are supposed to be strictly convex in e 2½ 0;  e , i.e. c0,c00 [0, lime!0c0(e) ¼ 0
and lime!  ec0ðeÞ¼1 .
In the second subperiod, every individual executes an investment project. In order
to become an entrepreneur in period t, an individual needs a ﬁxed amount of capital
cAt which may be thought of as a start-up cost, c[0. Depending on the intensity of
eﬀort, revenue P is a discrete random variable. Let the revenue space of an invest-
ment project Pt be given by fAtpig
n
i¼1 where n P 3 (for n ¼ 2, see Aghion et al.,
1999). Without loss of generality, assume outcomes to be in ascending order such
that pi\pj for any i\j. Due to entrepreneurs  limited liability, we abstract from
any subsequent payments, thus pi P 0. The probability of outcome pi conditional
on entrepreneurial eﬀort e is denoted by pi(e) P 0 which we assume to be twice-dif-
ferentiable in e. In order to formalize that additional eﬀort is beneﬁcial, we assume
that the monotone likelihood ratio property holds, thus p0
iðeÞ=piðeÞ > p0
jðeÞ=pjðeÞ for
all pi[pj (cf. Milgrom, 1981). This implies that oE(Pje)=oe[0. Moreover, we as-
sume that marginal expected revenue oE(Pje)=oe is monotonic and diﬀerentiable
in e and that lime!  eoEðPjeÞ=oe has a ﬁnite upper bound. The last assumption implies
that expected marginal revenue does not grow to inﬁnity as maximum eﬀort is
delivered.
In the following, individuals with suﬃcient capital to cover start-up costs are rich.
Individuals who need to borrow are poor. Suppose an individual is rich enough to
ﬁnance her investment project out of her endowment. Then cA 6 k and she supplies
k   cA to (world) capital markets where the riskless rate of interest is ﬁxed at q. Sub-
stitution of her budget constraint d ¼ p þ (1 þ q)(k   cA) into the utility function






piðeÞpi þð 1 þ qÞðk   cAÞ cðeÞA: ð2Þ
The assumptions about the eﬀort cost function and the investment project guar-






 Þpi ¼ c
0ðe
 Þ: ð3Þ
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expected revenue equals marginal eﬀort costs.
Now, consider a poor individual which needs to borrow b ¼ cA   k in order to
start a business. Let ti denote the transfer that the entrepreneur has to pay back
to the investor if outcome pi realizes. Due to the entrepreneur s limited liability con-
straint transfers are bounded by realized revenue, i.e. 0 6 ti 6 pi. For any repayment
scheme T :¼f tig
n
i¼1, the expected repayment to the investor is EðBjeÞ¼A
P
ipiðeÞti.
The expected repayment per eﬃciency unit is denoted by R(e): ¼ E(Bje)=A. The dis-
cussion of the lender s participation constraint E(Bje) P (1 þ q)b is delegated to Sec-
tion 3.2. For the moment, assume it to be satisﬁed. The maximization problem of a



















Obviously, this FOC diﬀers from (3) in the last term on the RHS which is the ex-
pected marginal repayment to the investor. This term is always nonnegative. To see
this, assume it to be negative. Then, a new transfer system may be designed that
yields the same repayment but induces the ﬁrst-best solution e .
3 Since the lender
is indiﬀerent between both transfer schemes, but the entrepreneur has higher residual
claims net of disutility if executing e , he chooses the ﬁrst-best repayment contract.
Since we assume the objective function—given the repayment structure—to be
strictly concave, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a borrower to choose
ﬁrst-best eﬀort is that he receives all the beneﬁts of his marginal eﬀort, i.e. the second
term on the RHS vanishes at e ¼ e :
oEðBje
 Þ=oe ¼ 0: ð6Þ
Therefore, an additional marginal eﬀort unit must not increase the expected
repayment on the loan. Otherwise the entrepreneur chooses an eﬀort level that is
too low compared to ﬁrst-best, i.e. ~ e < e .
3. First-best contracts
In this section, we derive the conditions for the existence of a repayment contract
which satisﬁes (6) as well as limited liability and is acceptable to the lender. As a
result, Pareto-eﬃcient production can be implemented. If the incentive and the repay-
ment constraint cannot be fulﬁlled, any feasible repayment contract creates a wedge
between the marginal revenue of the last eﬀort unit and the entrepreneur s share. This
3 For a formal proof of this claim, see Lemma 10 in Appendix A.
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inequality-growth models, cf. Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Aghion et al.
(1999). The obstacle to eﬃcient production in this case is the entrepreneur s limited
liability.
3.1. The incentive constraint
Since eﬀort is assumed to inﬂuence the project outcome in a productive way, addi-
tional eﬀort necessarily shifts probability mass from lower proﬁt states to higher
ones. Therefore, the introduction of state-dependent transfers in high proﬁt states
decreases the entrepreneurial expected return to additional eﬀort and, analogously,
transfers in low proﬁt states increase it. The magnitudes of these repayment-
scheme-based eﬀects are determined by the size of marginal probabilities and trans-
fers. If transfers are designed such that these eﬀects on marginal eﬀort return exactly
balance, the expected marginal repayment to the lender reduces to zero and the eﬀort
decision remains undistorted.
The following proposition provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the
existence of repayment contracts which solve the incentive problem (6) and high-
lights the weakness of requirements for the existence of ﬁrst-best contracts. It suﬃces
that the payoﬀ distribution has at least two strictly positive payoﬀs with marginal
probabilities diﬀering in sign. This directly implies the nonexistence of ﬁrst-best con-
tracts for two-state-payoﬀ distributions with p1 ¼ 0, since repayment occurs only in
the higher proﬁt state leading to a positive marginal expected repayment. If the pay-
oﬀ in the lowest of both states is positive, each ﬁrst-best contract is characterized by
transfer coincidence, t1 ¼ t2, and the limited liability assumption reduces to an
unbinding constraint which is usually ruled out. In all other cases, the binding lim-
ited liability constraint, t1\t2, implies a strictly positive marginal repayment. In
contrast, additional payoﬀ states allow for the simultaneity of a binding limited lia-
bility constraint and the existence of ﬁrst-best contracts, since the balance of trans-
fers to eliminate marginal expected repayment can involve more than two payoﬀ
states.
Deﬁnition 1. A repayment contract ftig
n
i¼1 is trivial if ti ¼ 0"i.
Proposition 2. If and only if there exist at least two strictly positive outcomes pi, pj,
such that signðp0
iðe ÞÞ ¼ signð p0
jðe ÞÞ and p0
i 6¼ 0, then there exist non-trivial repay-
ment contracts ftig
n
i¼1 which solve (6).
Proof. (I) Necessity: Given that at least one p0
i 6¼ 0, the only possibility not to have
two strictly positive outcomes with opposite signs in their corresponding probability
derivatives is having p1 ¼ 0 with signðp0
1ðe ÞÞ ¼ signð p0
kðe ÞÞ 8k > 1 ^ p0
k 6¼ 0. From
p1 ¼ 0 it follows that t1 ¼ 0. Therefore (6) reduces to
Pn
i¼2p0
iðe Þti ¼ 0. Since all p0
i in
this sum have the same sign (or are zero) and the same is true for all these transfers,
there exists no non-trivial repayment contract which can solve (6) in this case. This
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positive outcomes pi, pj, such that signðp0
iðe ÞÞ ¼ signð p0
jðe ÞÞ and p0
i 6¼ 0 and set
all transfers tk ¼ 0 "k 5 i,j. Then (6) is given by p0
iðe Þti þ p0
jðe Þtj ¼
0 ()   p0
iðe Þ=p0
jðe Þ¼tj=ti. Since both probability derivatives are opposite in sign
and ﬁnite, the LHS is a positive constant. Obviously there are inﬁnitely many possi-
bilities to choose transfers ti, tj such that 0\ti\pi,0 \tj\pj, and the equation
holds. This proves the proposition s sufﬁciency. h
3.2. The repayment constraint
Our ﬁrst proposition establishes the existence of repayment contracts that fulﬁl
the incentive constraint if the payoﬀ structure features at least two strictly positive
outcomes. The expected value of the resulting repayment has an upper bound. This
upper bound is determined by the distribution of payoﬀs because of the entrepre-
neur s limited liability. Notice that payoﬀs pi, transfers ti, and the maximum repay-
ment R
FBmax are measured per eﬃciency unit, i.e. consumption units per unit of
knowledge, for notational ease.
Deﬁnition 3. Let R
FBmax denote the maximum expected repayment from a ﬁrst-best
transfer system. It is the solution to the following problem:
R










 Þti ¼ 0 and 0 6 ti 6 pi:
In a decentralized market economy with poor entrepreneurs, production eﬃciency
requires R
FBmax P c(1 þ q) for any borrower. Otherwise, no contract exists which
gives the lender at least his outside option and induces the entrepreneur to deliver
ﬁrst-best eﬀort. If R
FBmax is not suﬃciently large to cover the repayment required
by the lender, the diﬀerence is given by s ¼ (1 þ q)(cA   x)   AR
FBmax. If produc-
tion eﬃciency is to be achieved, this calls for a project-speciﬁc subsidy policy in the
sense that the borrowers receives s/(1 þ q).
4. The dynamics
Aggregate output is the sum of returns to all investment projects. Since there is a
unit mass of individuals, the economy s capital endowment is equal to E(wh,t) ¼ At.
If all investment projects, each requiring cA as a sunk capital cost, are undertaken,
aggregate costs of entrepreneurship amount to cA. Hence the economy is a lender in
world ﬁnancial markets if c[1 and a borrower if c\1. If c ¼ 1 the economy is
endowed with exactly that amount of physical capital which is needed to provide
every individual with the project s start-up cost. Since this assumption has no impact
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expected return of a project executed by an individual with capital endowment e





As shown in the preceding section, depending on the speciﬁcation of investment
projects, there may be an endowment level which is too low to allow for a decentral-
ized ﬁrst-best outcome. Denote the wealth level per eﬃciency unit of the poorest








where ﬁrst-best revenue equals p  and the integral is strictly less than F(l)p . Note
that l equals zero if an individual borrowing the total start-up cost delivers ﬁrst-best
eﬀort and otherwise l ¼ c   R
FBmax=(1 þ q).
Following the literature, we assume for the evolution of the stock of knowledge
that At ¼ yt 1. Since the growth rate of aggregate output, gt, is approximately








Now we are ready to analyze the eﬀects of inequality: If investment projects are
such that every individual delivers ﬁrst-best eﬀort, l equals 0 and the economy s





If some entrepreneurs cannot commit to ﬁrst-best eﬀort, l is positive and the
economy s actual growth rate is lower than g 
t. Notice that the transmission channel
of inequality to lower growth requires investment projects to generate a positive l
which is not necessarily the case as has been demonstrated in the preceding section.
Otherwise this link vanishes. If, however, l[0 a project-speciﬁc subsidy-policy
implements optimal growth.
5. Credit-market frictions
In this section, we demonstrate how credit-market frictions serve as a catalyst for
the eﬀect of inequality on growth. As inequality increases, a higher degree of credit-
market imperfections leads to a stronger negative eﬀect on growth. Although Barro
(2000) suggests that the magnitude of inequality s impact on growth is conditioned
on credit-market imperfections, a direct theoretical foundation seems not yet avail-
able. Rather, inequality-growth models with imperfect credit markets pay attention
to a ﬁxed set of credit-market barriers (see e.g. Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Banerjee
and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Piketty, 1997).
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througheithercreditrationingoreﬀortdistortions.Foragivenincomedistribution,the
development of the ﬁnancial system increases aggregate output s growth rate which is
not uncontroversial as Levine (1997) argues. Our theoretical result complements the
empirical ﬁndings in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and these surveyed in Levine (1997).
5.1. Credit rationing
Here, credit rationing designates the inability to obtain the necessary amount of
external ﬁnance to cover start-up costs. Loans are denied whenever the largest ex-
pected repayment from a feasible contract falls short of the amount required by
investors. The entrepreneurial limited liability constraint is essential for the possibil-
ity of credit rationing, otherwise it is not even beneﬁcial to execute the project with
ﬁrst-best eﬀort.
4
Deﬁnition 4. Let R
max denote the maximum expected repayment from a repayment
scheme. It is the solution to the following problem:
R




subject to: (5) and 0 6 ti 6 pi:
Limited liability generates credit-rationing if R
max\(1 þ q)c which depends on
the particularities of the investment project involved. There are a number of reasons
why borrowers may face a repayment rate exceeding principal plus interest. These
include all sorts of transaction costs arising from writing and enforcing contracts
or accessing external ﬁnance as well as imperfect competition within the domestic
sector of ﬁnancial intermediation. Any of these capital-market imperfections leads
to an upward bias of the borrowers  net repayment rate. For a stylized incorporation
of these imperfections into our model, let 1 þ ^ q denote the repayment rate faced by
borrowing entrepreneurs. The diﬀerence ^ q   q P 0 accounts for the severity of the
outlined type of imperfections in ﬁnancial markets.
5
If the wealth level per eﬃciency unit of the poorest individual executing a (par-
tially or fully) externally ﬁnanced project is denoted by k 2 [0,l], the economy s
growth rate (7) can be written as:
gt ¼ ln p
    FðkÞp




    pðeÞdFðeÞ
  
: ð8Þ
4 The possibility of credit-rationing implies R
max\(1 þ q)c. Without limited liability, borrowing
entrepreneurs always deliver ﬁrst-best eﬀort. Due to the absence of an outside option for labor,
R
max ¼ E[Pje ¼ e ]   C(e ) such that we have E[Pje ¼ e ]   C(e )\(1 þ q)c.
5 Generally, the imperfection premium ^ q   q is a function of the loan s size, however, we ignore this
subtlety to keep the exposition simple.
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premium, the poorest entrepreneur must be richer, hence k rises and the growth rate
declines.
Proposition 5. (a) There is credit rationing iff Rmax < ð1 þ ^ qÞc, then k ¼ c   Rmax=
ð1 þ ^ qÞ where 0\k\l. Otherwise k ¼ 0. (b) If there is credit rationing, ﬁnancial
development reducing it increases the economy s growth rate.
Proof. (a) The proof is trivial, once k\l is established. For k\l, consider the



















Since the marginal repayment to the investor equals zero by the characterizing prop-
erty of ﬁrst-best contracts, the second term cancels and the derivative is strictly po-
sitive. Hence, R
max must exceed R
FBmax implying the feasibility of loans larger than
the one received by an individual with endowment l. It follows that entrepreneurs
repaying R
max must be poorer than entrepreneurs with wealth l facing T
FBmax
which implies k\l. (b) Financial development reducing credit rationing means low-
ering ^ q and thus reducing k. Differentiating (8) w.r.t. k veriﬁes the claim. h
5.2. Costly state veriﬁcation
We implicitly assumed that state-contingent contracts are costless enforceable.
Under the assumption of costly state veriﬁcation, Townsend (1979) and Gale and
Hellwig (1985) derive the empirically important standard debt contract as the opti-
mal contract which is a third-best contract in our model.
6 The restriction of feasible
repayment schemes to the class of standard debt contracts, which we interpret as an
additional credit-market imperfection, necessarily creates a negative link between
inequality and growth in the presence of limited liability constraints. If there are
growth distortions due to credit rationing, these are magniﬁed by the introduction
of costly state veriﬁcation.
Deﬁnition 6. If entrepreneur and investor agree on a standard debt contract (SDC),
the entrepreneur repays a payoﬀ-independent amount of s[0 or the full payoff if
the project s return falls short of s, i.e. ti ¼ s if pi P s and ti ¼ pi otherwise.
6 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this observation. First-best contracts induce borrowers
to exert e . Second-best contracts rule out Pareto-improvements for contracting borrowers requiring a
level of external ﬁnance below RFB max=ð1 þ ^ qÞ. Usually, these second-best contracts are state-contingent.
If only standard debt contracts are feasible, these are Pareto-inferior to state-contingent contracts and,
hence, termed third-best contracts.
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ers strictly prefer repayment schemes inducing them to exert more effort (without
exceeding the ﬁrst-best level) among repayment-neutral contracts. (c) Contracts induc-
ing the entrepreneur to exert more effort than the ﬁrst-best level are never implemented.
Proof. See the Appendix A. h
In a world with state-contingent repayment schemes, which allow for ﬁrst-best
and second-best contracts, the conﬁnement to SDCs has two eﬀects: The eﬀort level
of any borrowing entrepreneur falls and credit rationing ampliﬁes. Eﬀort levels de-
crease because SDCs inhere larger marginal expected repayments than state-contin-
gent contracts which reduce each borrower s share of additional expected project
return to additional eﬀort. Thus, SDCs preclude ﬁrst-best eﬀort as emphasized by
Lemma 7. Credit rationing broadens if the repayment-maximizing contract is non-
monotonic which always occurs if the investment project s payoﬀ distribution is
not extremely robust to changes in eﬀort.
7 As an unambiguous result of both eﬀects,
the growth rate of aggregate output diminishes for a given income distribution. Fig.
2 is drawn for a scenario with credit-rationing (CR) and l[0. Part (a) illustrates the
7 As an extreme, consider a payoﬀ distribution completely independent of eﬀort. Then, the repayment-
maximizing contract obviously conﬁscates the full return to the project in every payoﬀ state which
conforms to the deﬁnition of a standard debt contract. A weak suﬃcient condition for the exclusion of the
repayment-maximizing contract from the SDC class is tmax
n < pn 1.
Fig. 2. Eﬀects of standard debt contract restriction.
80 J.P. Reiß, L. Weinert / Journal of Macroeconomics 27 (2005) 69–86static equilibrium where state-contingent contracts are feasible. Part (b) highlights
how this allocation qualitatively changes as the choice of repayment contracts is con-
ﬁned to SDCs.
Let k
sdc denote the wealth level of the poorest individual executing a project under
the SDC constraint and expected project returns subject to the SDC restriction by
p
sdc(e). Then, the growth rate of aggregate output is given by:
g
sdc
t ¼ ln p
    FðkÞp















The ﬁrst three terms arise also without costly state veriﬁcation, see (8). The fourth
term accounts for additional credit rationing due to conﬁnement to SDCs and the
last integral measures the reduction of aggregate output implied by switching from
optimal contracts to SDCs. Since SDCs preclude borrowers from exerting ﬁrst-best
eﬀort (Lemma 7), only entrepreneurs not relying on external ﬁnance deliver e . The
next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 8. The conﬁnement to standard debt contracts induces borrowing entre-
preneurs to exert less effort and depresses aggregate output s growth rate. Credit
rationing broadens if the project s outcome is not too effort-insensitive, otherwise its
size remains unchanged.
Proof. See Appendix A. h
5.3. Growth eﬀects of inequality
Changes in the wealth distribution F(e) never aﬀect growth if there is no asymmet-
ric information or no limited liability constraint. Thus, if the credit market is perfect,
there is no relation between inequality and growth. Section 3 demonstrates that
credit market imperfections in the sense of the limited liability constraints with moral
hazard are not suﬃcient to create a negative link between wealth distribution and
aggregate output s growth rate. For such a relationship, the existence of additional
frictions in ﬁnancial markets such as credit rationing or costly state veriﬁcation is
necessary.
Given costly state veriﬁcation or credit rationing, growth rates (8) and (9) decline if
the densities of endowments at the lower end increase while these at relatively higher
endowment levels are non-increasing, hence additional inequality depresses growth.
Intuitively, if there is a larger share of poor individuals, a larger number of entrepre-
neurs relies on higher levels of external ﬁnance or is credit rationed, a lower number
faces little external ﬁnance and there are less self-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs. In Fig. 2(a),
the hypothetical pdf above the support becomes more skewed to the right.
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described above triggers a higher growth reduction if there are more credit market
frictions: Suppose costly state veriﬁcation is absent, then the shift reduces the growth
rate due to a larger number of credit rationed individuals. If there is costly state ver-
iﬁcation instead, growth is reduced by the larger number of entrepreneurs relying on
higher levels of external ﬁnance. If there is costly state veriﬁcation from the begin-
ning, a higher degree of credit market frictions is reﬂected in a larger imperfection
premium ^ q   q leading to more credit rationing for a given distribution. If there is
a distributional shift towards more inequality, there is an increased chance for entre-
preneurs to become credit rationed, if credit market frictions are stronger. Essen-
tially, additional inequality more severely reduces growth if there is a higher
degree of credit market imperfections.
8
6. Conclusion
We have shown that if moral hazard is present in a lender-borrower relationship,
the speciﬁcation of the lender s payoﬀ function is crucial for the contracts that can be
implemented. If the investor s outside option does not exceed the maximum possible
expected repayment from ﬁrst-best contracts, then limited liability, and therefore
incentives and inequality, are no obstacle to growth. The reason is that the repay-
ment contract does not distort the entrepreneur s eﬀort choice and no static inef-
ﬁciency arises.
If the lender s outside option happens to exceed maximum repayment, a project-
speciﬁc subsidy is suﬃcient to resolve any ineﬃciencies due to incentive problems
caused by inequality. The size of any such subsidy is always lower than the amount
of redistribution arising from policies in the Aghion et al. (1999) spirit which provide
the entrepreneur with the diﬀerence between the project s cost and her endowment.
We assume a discrete payoﬀ function for the entrepreneur s project. Innes (1990)
analysis suggests that our result should also hold for a continuous payoﬀ schedule.
Our model demonstrates that the existence of credit market imperfections due to
limited liability in a model of endogenous growth is not necessarily inconsistent with
the new empirical literature which calls the supposed negative link between income
inequality and growth into doubt.
The introduction of additional capital market imperfections into the model,
creates a negative link between inequality and growth. Then, the impact of inequality
on growth is stronger for a higher degree of frictions, which is consistent with Barro
(2000).
8 This assumes that the density of individuals which are not credit rationed under a less imperfect credit
market but credit rationed with more imperfections does not decrease with the distributional shift towards
inequality. Otherwise there may be less growth reductions with more imperfections.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 7
(a) We show that each interesting SDC generates a strictly positive marginal
repayment implying a borrower s eﬀort choice below e  by FOC (5). Let the expected
repayment of any standard debt contract T





where k denotes the lowest payoff state allowing to repay the ﬁxed-payment
s 2 (p1,pn], i.e. pk ¼ min{pijpi P s,i ¼ 1,...,n}, and the effort argument of proba-
bilities is suppressed. Rewriting R




























iðeÞ 0 and the fact that negative marginal probabilities correspond
only to the lowest payoﬀs by the payoﬀ distribution s MLRP, the ﬁrst summation
is zero and all remaining summations must be strictly positive due to missing lowest
marginal probabilities. Thus, oR
sdc=oe[0 ruling out ﬁrst-best effort e .
(b) Since borrowers are residual claimants of their projects and expected payoﬀs
net of eﬀort s disutility increase in eﬀort for levels smaller than e , borrowers
expected utility increases in e for e\e*.
(c) Let any repayment scheme T
0 induce a borrower to exert effort e
0[e .I ti s
sufﬁcient to show the existence of a repayment scheme allowing for a Pareto-
improvement. By Lemma 10, there exists a repayment contract T
1 which leads to the
same expected repayment but induces the borrower to deliver e . The investor is
indifferent between both contracts, but the borrower is better off with T
1 since
E[Pje]   C(e) decreases in e for e[e . h
Proof of Proposition 8
(I) Eﬀort Distortions: According to Lemma 9 (see below), the expected repayment
of any standard debt contract T
sdc with s 2 [0,pn 1) can be replicated by a
nonmonotonic contract T
nm inducing the borrower to exert more effort than under
T
sdc (without exceeding e ). By Lemma 7b, borrowers strictly prefer the nonmono-
tonic transfer system T
nm to the standard debt contract T
sdc. For SDCs with
s 2 [pn 1,pn] such dominant nonmonotonic contracts may or may not exist. Given
the conﬁnement to SDCs, it follows that all borrowers with sh 2 [0,pn 1) exert more
effort if nonmonotonic contracts are feasible. If there happens to exist SDCs with
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s\pn 1, borrowers with these contracts exert not less effort under the uncon-
strained regime but possibly more effort.
(II) Credit Rationing: In this context, it is trivial that a constrained class of
contracts cannot contain a transfer system with a larger expected repayment than
R
max. By the properties of a repayment-maximizing contract as laid out in Lemma 7,
the implied marginal repayment is positive and payoffs in low states, including all
states with nonnegative marginal probability, are fully transferred to the lender. If it
is possible to increase the transfer in the lowest nonexhausted payoff state j, then the
net impact on expected repayment is ambiguous for unspeciﬁed payoff structures
due to two diametric effects. To see this, consider the total change in expected
repayment R in response to a marginal increase of tj:
dR
dtj










Firstly, expected repayment (cet. par.) directly increases by the probability of payoﬀ
state j because of the higher repayment in state j. Secondly, the additional transfer
induces the entrepreneur to lower his effort, o~ e=otj < 0 since p0
j > 0. This (cet.
par.) indirectly reduces the expected repayment from the initial transfer structure.
For very effort-insensitive payoff distributions, the direct effect may always out-
weigh the indirect effect such that the repayment-maximizing contract repays the full
project return in every state. As long as T
max leaves the borrower with a positive
return only in the highest payoff state such that tmax
n 2½ pn 1;pn , it is a standard debt
contract. If the payoff distribution is slightly more effort-sensitive, T
max is nonmono-
tonic and the largest feasible loan under SDC must be smaller than in a regime allow-
ing for state-contingent contracts. It follows for sufﬁciently effort-sensitive payoff
structuresthattheconﬁnementtoSDCsmaybroadenorcreatecreditrationing.Obvi-
ously, there is no credit rationing if the largest SDC–repaid-loan covers the amount of
external ﬁnance needed by the poorest individual to undertake the investment project.
(III) Growth depression: Trivially, 0 6 p
sdc(e) 6 p(e). The latter inequality is
obviously strict for all wealth levels e 2 [l,c) since these allow for nonmonotonic
repayment schemes inducing ﬁrst-best effort. It follows that the last integral in (9) is
strictly positive (if not all potential borrowers are credit rationed, i.e. k
sdc\c) and
thus, the introduction of costly state veriﬁcation reduces the economy s growth rate
from (8). If the SDC restriction generates additional credit rationing, then k\k
sdc
and the decrease of the growth rate is reinforced by the second integral in (9). h
Lemma 9. For any SDC with s\pn 1, there exists a nonmonotonic contract which rep-
licates the expected repayment and induces the entrepreneur to exert a higher level of effort.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that a nonmonotonic contract exists which induces
more eﬀort and a higher repayment than the original SDC. Then, all transfers can
be scaled down to generate any lower repayment level as in the proof of Lemma
10. Due to s\pn 1, it is possible to slightly increase transfer tn 1 while reducing
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ular, suppose dtn ¼  pn 1=pndtn 1\0 such that a repayment in a higher proﬁt state
is reduced and a transfer in a lower proﬁt state enlarged. From (5), the effect of this
change in transfers on effort is given by:
d~ e
dtn 1















where SOC  
P
p00
i ðpi   tiÞ c00 < 0 and the second factor is negative by deﬁnition
of MLRP. The redesign s eﬀect on expected repayment is
dR
dtn 1











       
dtn=dtn 1¼pn 1=pn
> 0;
where the ﬁrst factor is the marginal repayment for a SDC which is strictly positive
by Lemma 7(a). It follows that the redesign of the repayment scheme increases ex-
pected repayment, too. h
Lemma 10. If any repayment scheme leads a borrower to exert effort ~ e > e , then
there exists a transfer system that replicates expected repayment R
  but induces e .
Proof. By (5), ~ e > e  is equivalent to
P
p0
ið~ eÞti < 0. Therefore, a small transfer
increase in some payoﬀ state j such that p0
j > 0 is feasible by
P
p0
iðeÞ 0. Effort falls
in response, since o~ eðTÞ=otj ¼ p0
j=SOC < 0 where SOC  
P
p00
i ðpi   tiÞ c00 < 0. The
total effect on expected repayment is strictly positive:
dR
dtj









Hence, it is possible to increase transfers in states with positive marginal probabilities
such that eﬀort equals the ﬁrst-best level and repayment exceeds R
 . By scaling down
all transfers proportionately which preserves e , the original level of repayment can
be replicated. h
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